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 ABSTRACT 
We compare the ownership-cost of Shareholders Firms (SHFs), Non Profit Organizations 
(NPOs), and Cooperatives (COOPs) involved in microfinance. A paradoxical situation 
motivates us: most providers, both historically and today, are NPOs or COOPs, while policy 
papers advocate SHFs. We lay out a theoretical framework to understand ownership costs in 
microfinance organizations better. We propose that cost variables related to market 
contracting favor NPOs and COOPs, whereas most cost variables related to the practice of 
ownership favor SHFs. We conclude that what best serves the customers is the coexistence of 
ownership types and call for empirical research to test this theory. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance is the supply of banking services to micro-enterprises and poor families. Private 
suppliers of microfinance are normally incorporated as member-based Cooperatives 
(COOPs), Non Profit Organizations (NPOs), or Shareholder Firms (SHFs). This paper 
compares the costs of these three ownership types. A paradoxical situation motivates us: 
While policy makers normally advocate SHFs, most suppliers of microfinance are NPOs or 
COOPs. Compared to a few hundred SHFs, there are thousands of NPOs and India alone has 
more than a hundred thousand COOPs (Misra and Lee, 2007). To understand ownership costs 
in Microfinance Organizations (MFOs) better, we lay out a theoretical driven framework and 
use it to compare the costs of the different types of MFOs. 
 
The UN Year of Microcredit in 2005 and the Nobel Peace Prize given to Mohammad Yunus 
and Grameen Bank in 2006 have given considerable public recognition to microfinance as a 
development tool. Christen et al. (2004) report an astonishing 500 million persons served, 
mostly with savings accounts, while the Microcredit Summit’s 2006 meeting in Halifax 
celebrated the milestone of 100 million borrowers. Nevertheless, microfinance still only 
reaches a fraction of the world’s poor (Christen et al., 2004, Robinson, 2001). Thus, there is a 
recognized supply challenge in the market (Helms, 2006).  
 
Other studies analyzing microfinance supply have compared the welfare approach and the 
sustainability approach: the first measures success by how well it fulfills the short-term needs 
of the poorest people; while the second proposes a long-term, “win-win” logic between 
poverty outreach and organizational sustainability (Woller et al., 1999, Morduch, 2000, 
Rhyne, 1998). This conceptual study complements existing research as it claims to be the first 
to present a systematic framework that explains the intrinsic ownership-cost differences 
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between the most common types of suppliers in the microfinance industry. Proper use of the 
framework could help direct future empirical work and policy guidelines on MFO ownership 
 
To develop the framework, we apply Hansmann’s (1996) economic theory of ownership, 
which identifies several variables influencing the cost of ownership. We relate each of these 
variables to the microfinance industry and analytically compare the ownership cost of SHFs, 
NPOs, and COOPs. To illustrate and support our analysis, we outline several examples and 
share descriptive global statistics from the MIX 2006 Benchmarks (www.themix.org). The 
effect of each cost-variable is isolated and finalized with a proposition which indicates 
whether the ownership costs in NPOs and COOPs are, on average, higher or lower than for 
SHFs. Based on an extension of Hansmann’s theory, we propose that cost-variables related to 
market contracts favor NPOs and COOPs, whereas most of the cost-variables related to the 
practice of ownership favor SHFs. The apparent lower costs of ownership-practice in SHFs 
provide strong support for this ownership type. However, our analysis also indicates that 
NPOs and COOPs can more effectively mitigate the costs of market contracts, and that such 
mitigation is highly relevant since most MFOs operate in severely inefficient markets. Thus, 
the theory does not support policy makers’ preferences for investor ownership. A mixture of 
different ownership types, similar to that found in mature banking markets, would probably 
best serve microfinance customers.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section two lays out ownership policies and 
empirics; while section three explains the theory and the methodology applied, followed by 
sections four and five, in which the cost variables for market contracts and the practice of 
ownership are analyzed. Section six presents a table summarizing the discussions of the 
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former sections. Section seven concludes the paper and provides implications for policy 
makers and researchers.  
 
2. OWNERSHIP POLICIES AND EMPIRICS IN THE MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY 
Policy papers generally advocate SHFs as the most appropriate ownership type for the 
microfinance market (Berenbach and Churchill, 1997, C-GAP, 2003, Chavez and Gonzalez-
Vega, 1994, Christen and Rosenberg, 2000, Greuning et al., 1998, Hardy et al., 2003, Jansson 
et al., 2004, Staschen, 1999). The arguments used are that SHFs can be regulated by banking 
authorities, accept deposits, provide a larger range of better quality services, be independent 
from donors, attract private equity capital, and benefit from superior corporate governance 
because they are privately owned. Some of these arguments relate to a situation where 
national legal frameworks consider NPOs and most COOPs as inferior banking organizations. 
Few NPOs are regulated and allowed to mobilize savings, and the supervision of most COOPs 
is generally considered outside the scope of banking authorities (C-GAP, 2003).   
 
One consequence of current policies has been a “call” for NPOs to transform into SHFs 
(White and Campion, 2002, Fernando, 2004, Rhyne, 2001). Accounts of successful 
transformations have been shared (Fernando, 2004), and guidelines on how to transform have 
been published (Ledgerwood and White, 2006, White and Campion, 2002). Between 1992 
and 2006, about 43 NPOs were transformed into shareholder organizations (Fernando, 2004, 
Hishigsuren, 2006). In most cases, the original NPO continued as a major owner in the new 
SHF (White and Campion, 2002, Ledgerwood and White, 2006). Transformed SHFs have 
generally been able to increase their outreach considerably (Ledgerwood and White, 2006). 
However, some observers fear that increased outreach doesn’t come without cost and warn 
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about a possible “mission drift” (Woller, 2002). Christen (2001), however, does not give 
credit to these fears.  
 
Empirical studies of the ownership effects on the dual microfinance objectives of outreach 
and sustainability are scarce. Exceptions are Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) who on a 
global dataset of rated MFOs found that the differences between NPOs and SHFs was 
minimal on both outreach and sustainability dimensions, similar to what Hartarska (2005) 
found in her study on corporate governance in East European MFOs. However, Gutierrez-
Nieto et al. (2007) did find that NPOs are more efficient in making a large number of loans 
while operating as cheaply as possible when compared to non-NPOs.  
 
Historically, pro-poor banking has been dominated by COOPs and NPOs, such as the 17th 
century philanthropic English loan funds (Hollis and Sweetman, 1998), the 18th century Irish 
loan funds (Hollis and Sweetman, 2004), the 19th century savings banks (Teck, 1968), and 
the 19th century Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen cooperatives (Teck, 1968). The 
cooperatives and savings banks still continue to flourish in several highly competitive markets 
(Christen et al., 2004, Peachey and Roe, 2006). In mature bank-markets, where different 
ownership types coexist, researchers find little evidence to suggest that SHFs are more 
efficient than the COOPs or NPOs (Altunbas et al., 2001, Crespi et al., 2004, ESBG, 2004).  
 
The global statistics from the MIX 2006 Benchmarks (www.themix.org) provide self-reported 
data from 704 MFOs. Five charter types are represented: Banks, Credit Unions, Non Bank 
Financial Institutions (NBFIs), NGOs, and Rural Banks. Banks and Rural Banks can have 
different types of ownership and be both privately and publicly owned. However, the Credit 
Unions are similar to the COOPs, the NGOs are similar to the NPOs, and the NBFIs are 
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similar to the SHFs. In table one, descriptive statistics for the three ownership types are 
displayed.  
 
Table 1: Selected benchmarks for MFOs according to their type of ownership 
Indicators: SHFs COOPs NPOs 
Number of MFOs 230 74 282 
 Median Median Median 
Age of MFO (years) 8 10 10 
Total assets (US$) 8 124 068 6 500 227 3 757 662 
Number of active borrowers 11 007 4 852 10 947 
Gross loan portfolio (US$) 6 395 958 5 401 213 2 834 596 
Average loan balance per borrower (US$) 562 1408 227 
Percentage of women reached 55% 51,9% 82,1% 
Return on Assets (ROA) 1,5% 0,3% 0,2% 
Portfolio at risk > 30 days 2,2% 4,2% 2,6% 
Write-off ratio 0,9% 2,0% 1,0% 
Operating expense/Loan portfolio 20,8% 14,0% 27,7% 
Cost per loan (US$) 144 156 70 
 
The smallest COOP in the dataset has more than three hundred thousand dollars in assets, and 
thus the COOPs represented are clearly not the average small COOP involved in 
microfinance. Few of these smaller COOPs are in a position to self report their data to the 
MIX. However, the data illustrates that MFOs differ according to their type of ownership. 
Generally speaking, NPOs are smaller in assets, but not in customers, when compared to 
SHFs. NPOs’ average loan balance is considerably lower than that for SHFs. Similarly, NPOs 
serve more female customers. Measured as Return on Assets, SHFs have higher profits, while 
risk profiles are fairly even with the NPOs. Lower operating expenses in SHFs seem to be 
related to higher average loans, since the cost per loan in NPOs is actually half that of SHFs. 
 
3. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
Like Hansmann (1996), we do not advocate any particular type of ownership. Instead, we 
search for non-legal (La-Porta et al., 1998) and non-historic (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) 
variables which influence the cost of ownership. SHFs are firms limited by shares like banks 
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and non-bank financial institutions, and owned by investors whether they are profit seeking or 
social investors, individuals or organizations. COOPs are customer owned organizations like 
credit unions, building societies, savings and credit cooperatives, etc. NPOs are organizations 
without any legal owners. We recognize that organizational objectives are not necessarily 
uniform within the same ownership type. However, we follow Hansmann’s logical reasoning 
that the intrinsic differences between SHFs, COOPs, and NPOs lie in who controls the 
organization and who receives the profit from it. In an SHF, the shareholders control the 
organization, decide on how to distribute the profits, and are free to sell their privileges. In a 
COOP, the ultimate control is in the hands of its members who, through their voting rights, 
can decide on policy issues. The members are also the only ones entitled to receive proceeds 
from the operations either through dividends or rebated prices on services. An NPO may have 
several stakeholders influencing the organization. However, no particular group or person can 
legally claim ownership of it or receive residual earnings from it. 
 
We view the firm as a nexus of contracts between different patrons and the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In MFOs the main patrons are employees, credit customers, savings 
customers, debt holders, equity holders, and donors.1 There are two possible relationships 
between the firm and the patrons: in the first, the patron deals with the firm through market 
contracts; while in the second, the patron can also be the owner of the firm. Both of these 
relationships involve costs and, by analyzing these, ownership types can be better understood 
and compared.   
 
                                                 
1 Service providers including rating agencies, networks, auditors, credit bureaus, providers of 
technical assistance, etc. are also important patrons of MFOs. However, they are considered 
outside the scope of this article. 
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Market contracts are not costless. Market failures, like an absence of effective competition 
and substantial informational disadvantages, prevail in the microfinance industry (Porteous, 
2006). In all the relevant markets – employees, customers (both savings and credit), debt 
holders, equity holders, and donors – market imperfections exist. According to Hansmann, the 
costs of market imperfections can be reduced by assigning ownership to the affected patrons 
or avoiding having owners (NPOs). For the purpose of this paper, we will concentrate on 
market failures affecting customers and, when relevant, donors.  
 
The practice of ownership involves costs. Agency costs, derived from the separation of 
ownership and control, as well as the cost of collective decision-making, are well known from 
the literature and will, together with other relevant costs, be studied in this paper. The 
assumption is that, whether ownership of MFOs is assigned to investors, customers, or 
nobody (NPOs), different costs will be incurred.  
 
In our analysis, we identify cost-variables found in or deduced from Hansmann (1996). We 
start with cost-variables related to market contracts, followed by variables related to 
ownership. We isolate the effect of each variable and compare the cost of SHFs with the cost 
of COOPs and NPOs. We end each comparison with a proposition indicating, all else being 
constant, whether the ownership cost for the studied variable is higher or lower in COOPs and 
NPOs when compared to SHFs. In table four, we summarize our analysis by assigning the 
term ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ to each of the studied variables. We do not at any point try to indicate 
how much higher or lower the cost might be. When the analysis provides no clear indication, 
we assign the symbol ‘?’. We generally do not try to compare cost differences between 
COOPs and NPOs, but recognize that there can also be considerable differences between 
these ownership types. Occasionally in the text we make the reader aware of such differences. 
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We do not claim that the cost-variables analyzed are all similar in importance; nor do we 
claim that we cover all relevant cost-variables.  
 
4. THE COSTS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 
According to Hansmann (1996), the costs of market imperfections can be reduced by 
ownership assignment. In the following, we analyze cost-variables identified by Hansmann 
and apply them to the microfinance industry. We discuss how the costs of market contracts 
vary depending on whether the supplier of microfinance is an SHF, a COOP, or an NPO.   
 
Market inefficiency # 1: The cost of limited competition 
Customers pay the price of limited competition in microfinance markets: first, in the form of 
high interest rates on loans or low interest on savings offered by monopoly/oligopoly MFOs; 
and second, in the form of under-consumption, or no consumption at all, of important banking 
services. Where MFOs exist, the markets are normally characterized by a severe lack of 
competition, and most clients have limited bargaining power vis-à-vis the provider of 
microfinance. The median yield on gross loan portfolio charged by the 704 MFOs reporting to 
the 2006 MIX Benchmarks is 30,2%, the mean 34,3%, and the maximum 139,5%. In Mexico, 
the MFO Compartamos has over years maintained a ROE above 50%, driven by interest rates 
of around 100% p.a. (Rosenberg, 2007). However, in Bolivia, where competition has been 
increasing, the average annual yield has decreased during the last decade from 50% to just 
above 20% in the leading MFOs (Porteous, 2006).    
 
All else being constant, since SHFs have owners with the right to appropriate the profits, they 
should have a stronger incentive than NPOs and COOPs to exploit their customers. Yet the 
Compartamos case illustrates that NPOs can also maximize their profits. Before transforming 
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into an SHF, it also used to charge around 100% interest on the loans. However, there was an 
argument to expand outreach to more clients, not to produce profits for owners (Rosenberg, 
2007).  
 
In addition, some COOPs charge high interests on loans. For example, informal member 
owned savings and credit groups (similar to very small COOPs) often charge interests above 
100% per year. However, the argument here is to offer the net-savers a high return on savings, 
not to enrich investors (Allen, 2006). 
 
The data from the MIX 2006 Benchmarks illustrates that the larger COOPs represented do on 
average offer considerable lower interest rates on loans compared to NPOs and SHFs, while 
NPOs on average charge higher interest rates than their peers. However, when calculating the 
financial margin adjusted for operating expenses and loan losses, NPOs have the lowest 
margin while COOPs have the highest as illustrated in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Median portfolio yield and financial margins in MFOs 
 Portfolio Yield Financial 
margin 
COOP 23% 3,5% 
SHF 34,2% 2,7% 
NPO 38,6% 1,8% 
 
Other ownership-costs, like the cost of managerial opportunism, may in some contexts 
outperform the NPOs’ and COOPs’ advantage in minimizing the costs that stem from limited 
competition. However, the exercise in this paper is to isolate the costs related to each cost-
variable. Thus, when isolating the cost of limited competition, NPOs and COOPs should have 
lower costs compared to SHFs since NPOs don’t have owners that can appropriate their 
profits and financial margins in COOPs benefit the members. Thus, on average, the following 
proposition should hold: 
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 Proposition # 1: 
The ownership-cost related to limited market competition is lower in NPOs and COOPs than 
in SHFs.  
 
Market inefficiency # 2: The cost of “lock-in” market power 
Monopolistic exploitation can also occur after beginning to patronize with an MFO. The use 
of non-tangible collaterals, such as credit history and group guarantees, has been the main 
innovation in microfinance and made it possible for MFOs to mitigate the risk of lending 
(Aghion and Morduch, 2005, Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). However, an unexplored side 
effect of the innovations can be that they increase the difficulty in shifting between credit 
providers. Establishing new credit groups is complex (Marr, 2006), and if an existing credit 
group wants to shift from one MFO to another, all the members have to agree jointly. Single 
members wanting to shift need to be accepted into new credit groups. Similarly, the 
importance of credit history in lending appraisals may lead to a lock-in situation. Starting with 
a small loan, a credit history can be built, and increases in loan amounts can often be expected 
(Aghion and Morduch, 2005). However, a credit history is an intangible asset, which in 
markets without effective credit rating bureaus is difficult to transfer from one MFO to 
another.  
 
The cost of “lock-in” market power in the microfinance industry has not, as far as we know, 
been subject to a major research effort. However, as competition increases the need to remain 
in good standing with a single lender decreases (Vogelgesang, 2003). Thus, easy shift of 
suppliers becomes important.  
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There is currently a tendency in the industry to shift from group methodologies to individual 
lending. Of the 704 MFOs reporting to MIX 2006 Benchmarks, 136 practice only different 
forms of group methodologies, while the rest practice either pure individual lending (252 
MFOs) or a combination of individual and group lending (316 MFOs). Individual lending 
allows bigger loans (Cull et al., 2007), and it is possible that the shift towards individual 
lending is a response to increased competition and the need to reduce the cost of lock-in 
market power.  
 
Similar to the cost of limited competition, the cost of lock-in can be mitigated by assigning 
ownership to customers (COOPs) or ownerless organizations (NPOs) with fewer intrinsic 
incentives to exploit the customers.  
 
Proposition # 2: 
The ownership-cost related to “lock-in” market power is lower in NPOs and COOPs than in 
SHFs.  
 
The cost of asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information increases the cost of market contracting. In microfinance, a situation 
of asymmetric market information is particularly present in four relationships; MFO-
borrowers, MFO-depositors, MFO-donors, and MFO-debt holders; the last is outside the 
scope of this paper.  
 
Market inefficiency # 3: The cost of asymmetric information between MFOs and 
borrowers 
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In a principal-agent model, the principal, the MFO, knows little about how the agent, the 
borrower, will use a loan or if the loan will be repaid. Hence, all banks establish expensive 
screening and selection processes together with follow up and monitoring of the customers to 
minimize agency-costs (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). In addition, microfinance often mitigates 
risks through the use of group guarantees. The involvement of neighbors, family members, 
and friends in selecting and monitoring clients reduces the costs of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. In addition, a borrower will be less inclined to default when they know that 
friends and family members will have to bear the loss. To decrease the cost of asymmetric 
information further, ownership of the MFO can be fully assigned to the borrowers, as in a 
credit cooperative. However, a well-known challenge in larger COOPs is individuals 
exploiting the firm at the expense of other members. This is probably why most COOPs have 
difficulties in expanding outside their local communities, and also why a common bond 
between the members is seen as a prerequisite for successful COOPs (Magill, 1994). For 
example, in Uganda where there are more than one thousand COOPs, a study including 147 of 
the largest COOPs revealed that on average they only had 640 members (Deshpande et al., 
2006). Thus, we propose that, on average, smaller COOPs have lower costs regarding 
asymmetric information between MFOs and borrowers compared to SHFs.  
 
We do not propose that borrowers are more inclined to repay their loans to NPOs than to 
SHFs. However, asymmetric information between borrowers and MFOs also involves the risk 
that the MFO will use their superior knowledge to exploit customers. In many markets this is 
a major problem, as MFOs tend not to reveal the true cost of borrowing. Real interest rates are 
covered in creative contracts including countless types of commissions and fees (C-GAP, 
2003, Porteous and Helms, 2005). Regulation efforts and consumer education programs like 
those carried out by AMFIU in Uganda (www.amfiu.org.ug) are being installed to increase 
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transparency in and understanding of microfinance operations. NPOs, COOPs, and SHFs all 
tend to conceal their real interest rates. However, on average, owners with pecuniary 
incentives to exploit customers are more inclined to veil information. Thus, taking all this 
together, we propose the following proposition: 
  
Proposition # 3: 
The ownership-cost related to asymmetric information between the MFO and the borrower is 
lower in NPOs and COOPs than in SHFs.  
 
Market inefficiency # 4: The cost of asymmetric information between MFOs and 
depositors 
One of banks’ major functions is to monitor borrowers on behalf of depositors (Freixas and 
Rochet, 1997). However, the depositors are in a poor position to determine exactly how the 
bank is managing their money (Diamond, 1984). Since the owners of SHFs don’t share profits 
but only losses with their depositors, they have pecuniary incentives for opportunistic 
behavior, including risky lending (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Hansmann, 1996, Rasmussen, 
1988, Arun, 2005).  
 
In several SHFs most shareholders are NPOs, socially oriented funds, or donors with limited 
incentives to exploit depositors (Goodman, 2005, Ivatury and Abrams, 2005, Ivatury and 
Reille, 2004). Yet there is a strong push in the industry to attract more profit driven investors, 
both local business people (Jansson et al., 2004) and international investors (Ivatury and 
Reille, 2004, Abrams and Stauffenberg, 2007). Since owners of SHFs are free to sell their 
shares and several donors have a limited time horizon for their investments, more profit-
minded investors will probably enter the industry in the years to come. In the Compartamos 
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IPO in Mexico in April 2007, truly commercial investors bought most of the shares 
(Rosenberg, 2007).  
 
As a response to asymmetric information between banks and depositors, governments impose 
regulations and deposit insurance schemes. Today, even a country like Congo (DRC), 
crippled by conflict and poverty, has a banking law aimed at reducing depositors’ risk. During 
the last decade, emphasis has been placed on how to regulate microfinance operations and 
organizations effectively, and most of the important bilateral and multilateral agencies have 
commissioned policy documents and guidelines (Berenbach and Churchill, 1997, Christen et 
al., 2003, Chavez and Gonzalez-Vega, 1994, Christen and Rosenberg, 2000, Greuning et al., 
1998, Hardy et al., 2003, Jansson et al., 2004, Staschen, 1999). However, what seems to be 
generally overestimated is the capacity of such schemes to monitor institutions effectively in 
countries where corruption blossoms and banking authorities are generally weak. Another 
issue that does not seem to be taken into account is how the presence of deposit insurance 
schemes can encourage SHFs to take on more risk than COOPs (Fisher and Fournier, 2002).  
 
To minimize the agency costs related to asymmetric information between depositors and 
MFOs, ownership can be attached to the depositors (COOP) or it can be given to an 
organization without owners (NPO), with fewer overall incentives to exploit depositors 
(Cuevas and Fischer, 2006).  
 
Proposition # 4: 
The ownership-cost related to asymmetric information between the MFO and the depositors is 
lower in COOPs and NPOs than in SHFs.  
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Market inefficiency # 5: The cost of asymmetric information between MFOs and donors 
Donors influence the microfinance industry (C-GAP, 2006). As depositors, donors don’t 
know precisely how MFOs use the money that is received. Even though (some) donors 
impose costly monitoring schemes like auditing, rating, follow up visits, and on-site experts, 
there is still a considerable risk that the MFO will distort the use of a donation. Therefore, 
since NPOs have no owners and, therefore, implicitly fewer incentives to exploit donors, all 
else being equal, donors prefer contracting with NPOs (Easley and O'Hara, 1983, Glaeser and 
Shleifer, 2001, Hansmann, 1996). In addition, several donors face legal constraints in 
partnering with SHFs since the shareholders can appropriate public funds (e.g. the Danish and 
Norwegian agencies for development, DANIDA and NORAD). In the Compartamos case, 
where private individual shareholders captured over $150 million from the IPO, it has been 
fiercely debated whether donor grants received by Compartamos over the years have now 
made their way into private pockets (Rosenberg, 2007).  
 
If we assume that donors have a preference for poorer clients, it should be relatively 
unproblematic for them to provide funds to COOPs as long as the members are below a 
defined poverty level. Thus, several donors are involved in expanding the outreach of rural 
COOPs, like for instance the Swedish Cooperative Centre in Uganda, Malawi, and Tanzania 
(www.utangranser.se). However, most donors will probably find it difficult to partner with 
COOPs serving middle class members.   
 
If we accept that, in theory, donors prefer to partner with NPOs and COOPs with poor 
members, how can we explain the increasing number of donors recommending NPOs to 
transform into SHFs? We believe that the answer is found in understanding the combined 
effect of the 11 variables studied in this article, but recommend additional research aimed at 
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better understanding donor behavior. However, ceteris paribus, the following proposition 
should hold: 
 
Proposition # 5: 
The ownership-cost related to asymmetric information between the MFO and the donors is 
lower in NPOs and COOPs serving poor members than in SHFs.  
 
5. THE COST OF OWNERSHIP-PRACTICE 
Hansmann (1996) argues that: “ownership has two essential attributes: exercise of control 
and receipt of residual earning. There are costs inherent in each of these attributes” 
(Hansmann, 1996, p. 35).  In what follows, we analyze six cost-variables related to the 
practice of ownership.   
   
The cost of controlling managers 
With a few exceptions (e.g. PT Bank Dagang Bali in Indonesia), the owners and managers of 
MFOs are separate bodies, with the former delegating most decision-making authority to the 
latter. This separation of ownership and management leads to agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b, Fama and Jensen, 1983a, Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hansmann (1996) defines these 
agency costs as: “the sum of the costs incurred in monitoring [the management] and the costs 
of managerial opportunism that result from the failure or inability to monitor with complete 
effectiveness” (Hansmann, 1996, p. 38). We start by analyzing the monitoring costs, followed 
by a study of the costs of managerial opportunism. 
 
Ownership variable # 1: The cost of monitoring the management 
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The cost of monitoring management can, according to Hansmann (1996), be divided into 
three areas: 1) owners’ costs in informing themselves about operations; 2) the cost of 
communicating between the owners; and 3) the cost of communicating owners’ decisions to 
the management. These costs depend on the importance, frequency, and duration of the 
relationship between the owner and the firm.  
 
Members of COOPs entrust their valuable savings, make frequent use of the services, and 
often continue being members of the organization over a long period of time. Normally, 
members live relatively close to each other and in the neighborhood of the COOP. This could 
indicate that COOPs have an advantage compared with other forms of MFO.  However, a 
major problem in larger COOPs is the high number of owners, which leads to a substantial 
duplication of effort in being informed. The high number of owners also leads to a problem of 
“free riders,” where each and every one has little incentive to control management effectively. 
Therefore, cooperatives generally require costly and bureaucratic processes to keep the 
members informed and alert (Normark, 1996). There is the additional challenge that many 
members of cooperatives have low levels of literacy and numeracy, and limited knowledge 
about monitoring managers and banking operations. Therefore, even though members have 
personal incentives to monitor management, the overall monitoring costs in COOPs, 
particularly in large COOPs, are high. 
 
Some argue that NPOs don’t have the costs involved in monitoring management since there 
are no owners to inform or communicate with. The fact is quite different. Most organizations, 
including NPOs, delegate monitoring to boards (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Board members in 
NPOs are mostly middle and upper class professionals (Labie, 2001). Some of these give high 
importance to their duties, but generally NPOs struggle to recruit board members who are 
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willing to dedicate the time and effort needed to oversee operations effectively (Labie, 2001). 
To balance the need for professional board members, some NPOs have members from 
international donors sitting on their boards (e.g. several of the FINCA affiliates). While this 
might improve the oversight of operations, it also increases the costs of communications, 
travels, board fees, etc. 
 
Most SHFs have few owners. This reduces the cost of monitoring; however, with more than 
one owner, the cost of the duplication of effort cannot be avoided. One element pushing the 
cost up is the number of owners situated in the north when most MFOs operate in the south, 
and often ownership is shared between distant owners, e.g. European and American 
(Goodman, 2005). Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that the costs of monitoring 
managers in SHFs are generally lower than in COOPs and NPOs. 
 
Proposition # 6: 
The ownership-cost related to monitoring managers is higher in COOPs and NPOs than in 
SHFs.  
 
Ownership variable # 2: The cost of managerial opportunism 
When ownership and control are separated, it is impossible to prevent managers completely 
from getting involved in self-dealing transactions – those not fully aligned with owners’ 
interests. Owners with strong incentives, e.g. owners with pecuniary incentives, to monitor 
management can reduce these agency costs. This logic is implicit in most ownership 
literature, and is highlighted by microfinance policy makers advocating the need for owners 
with their own personal money at stake (Helms, 2006, Jansson et al., 2004). 
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However, history has proven that large groups of firms, like nonprofit hospitals and savings 
banks, have been able to survive without having owners with personal pecuniary incentives in 
place to control management. This indicates that there must be alternative governance 
mechanisms to ownership control that keep managers working hard. The oft-mentioned 
alternative mechanisms are: competition, legal and moral constraints, public regulation, 
incentive pay aligned with owners’ interests, and the management labor market (Hansmann, 
1996, Denis, 2001, Jensen, 1993).  
 
It should not be forgotten that most MFOs operate in countries ripe with corruption, where the 
legal frameworks are mixed, law enforcement is weak, and effective government regulation is 
uncertain. Therefore, there are good reasons to believe that the effects of some alternative 
governance mechanisms are more limited in most microfinance markets. Mersland and Strøm 
(Forthcoming) found that increased levels of competition in microfinance markets induced 
efficient operations and reduced interest rates. However, as mentioned, competition in most 
markets is still weak. Adding to this is the challenge related to the lack of managerial capacity 
in the industry (C-GAP, 2004), which reduces managers’ incentives to improve performance. 
Since no better options are available for the owners, managers can continue to produce slack 
results.  
 
Increased use of incentive pay could solve some MFO governance challenges. However, 
aligning the interest of banking managers too much with the interests of owners with 
pecuniary incentives is problematic in banking firms, since this could induce managers to take 
higher risks at the expense of depositors and other debt holders (John and John, 1993).  
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Calomiris and Kahn (1991) suggest that, since deposits can be withdrawn on demand, the 
managers should get an incentive to control expenses. Hollis and Sweetman (2007) confirm 
this argument. Using data on the nineteenth-century Irish loan funds, they find that operating 
expenses as well as salaries increased, with lower levels of funding financed by deposits. Data 
from the MIX 2006 benchmarks may indicate a similar situation today, as indicated in table 
three. 
 
Table 3: Median efficiency ratios in MFOs in relation to level of financial intermediation 
 Operating 
expense ratio 
Personnel 
expense ratio 
Total assets  
(US$) 
Non financial 
intermediation 25,5% 13,9% 4 427 864 
Low financial 
intermediation 17,9% 10,5% 6 511 754 
High financial 
intermediation 15,7% 7,2% 12 827 330 
 
Table three illustrates that higher levels of financial intermediation seem to result in lower 
costs. In the microfinance industry, this situation has normally been explained as economies 
of scale, as indicated in the table. However, it may be that the microfinance industry and its 
policy makers have overlooked the potential of having depositors as an important governance 
mechanism to lower the cost of managerial opportunism. This opposes common guidelines 
which deny NPOs the right to mobilize deposits. It should therefore spur interest among 
researchers.  
 
Labie (2003) suggests that organizational culture and cross-control between managers plays a 
major role in controlling NPO managers. Others suggest that having a clear mission, a well-
defined target public, and close alignment with important stakeholders, particularly the 
customers, will reduce agency costs (Lapenu and Pierret, 2005). We share these views. 
However, a lack of ownership control cannot be fully balanced with other governance 
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mechanisms. Thus, in line with (Rasmussen, 1988), we propose that SHFs have an advantage 
compared to COOPs and NPOs.  
 
Proposition # 7: 
The ownership-cost related to managerial opportunism is higher in COOPs and NPOs than in 
SHFs.  
 
Ownership variable # 3: The cost of collective decision making 
When ownership is shared between different owners, there are likely to be different opinions 
regarding policies and strategies. The universal approach to dealing with this problem is to 
adopt a voting scheme. However, regardless of being able to reach a decision with the help of 
a predefined voting scheme, heterogeneity in interests between owners results in increased 
costs of collective decision making. These costs can, according to Hansmann (1996), be 
divided into three groups: 1) decisions taken which are not aligned with all owners’ interests; 
2) the considerable time and effort it takes to participate in the decision making process; and 
3) resolving conflict between owners.  
 
In theory, investors have a single, well-defined objective: to maximize the financial returns on 
their investments. However, owners of SHFs are a heterogeneous group consisting of profit 
seeking investors, “green” investors, donors with holistic motivation, and multilateral 
agencies like the IFC of the World Bank (Ivatury and Reille, 2004, Goodman, 2005). When 
these seek to align their preferences, the cost of collective decision making increases. As far 
as we know, no study is available regarding the cost of collective decision making in SHFs 
with owners having heterogeneous objectives. And yet, particularly in transformed SHFs, 
where the original NPOs have teamed up with commercial investors, we assume that the cost 
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of collective decision making can often be high. Elisabeth Rhyne (2001) describes how 
different owners in Banco Sol in Bolivia (transformed from Prodem) at certain stages 
struggled to maintain control, with one block pushing hard for faster profits while another was 
seeking to maintain Banco Sol’s unique identity. This power play is costly. Nevertheless, to 
improve monitoring and decrease agency costs, policy advocates continue to recommend the 
inclusion of profit-minded investors as a counterweight to domination by the original NPO 
(Jansson et al., 2004). Whether the benefit of including profit-minded owners outweighs the 
cost of having owners with diverging interests should be the subject of further research. 
  
In COOPs, there is a diverging interest between net-borrowers and net-depositors (Cuevas and 
Fischer, 2006, Ledgerwood, 1999). Balancing the interests of depositors and borrowers – with 
depositors pushing for increased deposit interest rates and minimizing risk in lending, and 
borrowers pushing for reduced interest rates and increased lending risk – is a costly and 
difficult task. Still, Falkenberg (1996) suggests that the diverging interests between net-
borrowers and net-depositors can be an effective mechanism to reduce the costs in 
cooperative enterprises. Having some owners claiming higher interest rates on their deposits 
and other owners claiming reduced interest rates on loans can generate slim and efficient 
operations. The data reported in table one from the MIX 2006 Benchmarks may support 
Falkenberg’s proposition. Here, the median operating expense ratio to loan portfolio in 
COOPs is 14%, compared to 20,8% in SHFs and 27,7% in NPOs. However, since loan 
amounts considerably differ, additional research is needed for confirmation. Besides, since 
COOPs need to invest in time-consuming communication processes between members and 
management to maintain success, they can easily develop into bureaucracies or management 
controlled organizations (Spear, 2004, Normark, 1996, Cornforth, 2004, Rasmussen, 1988). 
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Thus, we suggest that the cost of collective decision making is higher in COOPs than in 
SHFs.  
 
Since NPOs are governed by missions and bylaws and not by owners, it can be argued that the 
cost of collective decision making here is limited. However, missions change and their 
interpretations vary. Trustees and founders often diverge in opinion, and board meetings can 
be temperamental. Therefore, we find it difficult to propose whether the cost of collective 
decision making is higher or lower in NPOs than in SHFs. 
 
Proposition # 8: 
The cost of collective decision making is higher in COOPs than in SHFs. 
 
Ownership variable # 4: The costs related to access to equity capital 
The type of ownership influences access to equity capital. NPOs have no other sources to 
draw upon other than excess earnings and uncertain funding from donors, while COOPs can 
also turn to their members. Further growth in NPOs is hampered by a severe equity constraint 
(Gibbons and Meehan, 2002), and the ability of COOPs to attract extra capital from their 
generally poor members is limited. The possibility of increased access to equity capital is a 
major reason for transforming from NPOs to SHFs (Fernando, 2004). 
 
SHFs are unrivalled when it comes to possible access to equity capital. There are a limitless 
number of sources and the available capital is almost infinite. Many commercial investors 
have entered or are about to enter the microfinance industry (Ivatury and Abrams, 2005, 
Ivatury and Reille, 2004, Goodman, 2005, Abrams and Stauffenberg, 2007). By mid-2004, 
commercially oriented, but still donor dominated, investment funds had invested nearly US 
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$1.2 billion as loans or equity in about 500 MFOs. Most of these investments were 
concentrated in a small number of SHFs (Ivatury and Abrams, 2005).  
 
Proposition # 9: 
The ownership-cost related to access to equity capital is higher in NPOs and COOPs than in 
SHFs. 
 
The costs related to capital “lock-in” 
Capital “lock-in,” defined as the difficulty of disinvesting capital, can be studied from at least 
two angles: capital efficiency and service availability. 
 
Ownership variable # 5: The costs of capital efficiency as a result of capital “lock-in”    
If NPOs are inferior in accessing equity capital, they are even more sluggish when it comes to 
reducing capital investment when demand declines. As competition increases, some NPOs 
risk being overcapitalized. Nimal A. Fernando, the microfinance specialist of the Asian 
Development Bank, raises the question as to whether the NPOs BRAC and ASA in 
Bangladesh have too much cash on their hands.2 Another example is Diaconia FRIF in 
Bolivia, with total capital of more than USD 13 million, of which nearly 98% is equity. To 
illustrate: Diaconia FRIF’s equity is about 2/3 of Banco Sol’s, while their loan portfolio is less 
than 10%.3 
 
While an SHF can easily move capital from managers’ hands to owners’ hands, the capital 
placed in an NPO is either lost or stays with the institution until its dissolution. Similar to a 
                                                 
2 Question raised by Mr. Fernando on the 25th of September 2006 at the devfinance@ag.ohio-state.edu 
discussion list. 
 
3 Rating report 2006, www.planetrating.com and information from www.mixmarket.org 
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SHF, a COOP can pay dividends, either in cash or as rebated prices on services, and thereby 
reduce its capital investment. However, this is not easily done since COOP managers tend to 
be powerful (Rasmussen, 1988). Hence, on average, SHFs are also more effective in capital 
disinvestment than COOPs. 
 
Proposition # 10: 
The ownership-cost related to capital efficiency as a result of capital “lock-in” is higher in 
NPOs and COOPs than in SHFs. 
 
Ownership variable # 6: The costs of service availability as a result of capital “lock-in” 
“Lock-in” of capital can be an advantage for poor households. When capital cannot be moved, 
the services cannot easily be taken away from the customers. When SHFs decide to close 
operations or shift to more profitable market segments, NPOs will normally tend to stay in 
business even if their financial return is far below a regular market return. This is also true for 
COOPs who cannot abandon their own members.  
 
The risk of capital divestment is similar to what, in the microfinance industry, is termed 
“mission drift” (Woller, 2002). Christen (2001) reported little evidence of mission drift in 
transformed SHFs in Latin America, whereas Woller (2002) argued that mission drift is 
inherently more evident in SHFs than NPOs. What should also be kept in mind is that today’s 
owners of an SHF are not necessarily tomorrow’s. As opposed to NPOs and COOPs, shares in 
SHFs can be sold. Besides, most investors, including those seeking a double bottom line, 
naturally seek opportunities with increased returns. This indicates that there can be a cost 
related to serving the poorest, and since NPOs and COOPs cannot easily divest or change 
market segments, they tend to stick with their customers even if profits are slack. However, 
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Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) did not find that NPOs are better in outreach compared to 
SHFs. Still, the benchmarks from table one seem to indicate that NPOs serve poorer clients. 
Their median loan amount is less than half compared to SHFs and 82,1% of their customers 
are women. At the same time their financial return is low, with a ROA of 0,2%. The COOPs 
in the dataset are not representative for most rural-based, small COOPs; however, since 
COOPs are totally bound to their members, divestment or “mission drift” are a minor concern 
for them. 
 
Also, studies from other sectors, like US health centers, indicate that nonprofits perform better 
than the for-profits in serving the underserved (Khoury et al., 2001). Thus, taken together, the 
following proposition should hold.  
 
Proposition # 11: 
The ownership-cost related to service availability as a result of capital “lock-in” is lower in 
NPOs and COOPs than in SHFs. 
 
6. COMPARING OWNERSHIP TYPES 
Table four summarizes the analysis in sections four and five. Based on an extension of 
Hansmann’s (1996) theory, we propose that cost-variables related to microfinance market 
contracts generally favor NPOs and COOPs, whereas most cost-variables related to the 
practice of ownership favor SHFs.  These propositions are a starting point for better 
understanding the cost of ownership in MFOs and should become the subject for further 
research.  
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 Table 4: Ownership costs in Cooperatives and Nonprofits compared to Shareholder Firms 
Proposition 
number 
COST VARIABLES: COOPs NPOs  
 Cost of market contacts:   
1 Limited competition Lower Lower 
2 “Lock-in” market power Lower Lower 
3 Asymmetric information, MFO-borrowers Lower Lower 
4 Asymmetric information, MFO-depositors Lower Lower 
5 Asymmetric information, MFO-donors Lower Lower 
 Cost of ownership:   
6 Cost of monitoring  Higher Higher 
7 Cost of managerial opportunism Higher Higher 
8 Cost of collective decision making Higher ? 
9 Access to equity capital Higher Higher 
10 Capital efficiency as a result of capital “lock-in” Higher Higher 
11 Service availability as a result of capital “lock-in” Lower Lower 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
We have studied the cost of ownership in microfinance organizations. Our analyses indicate 
that the costs of microfinance market contracts are generally higher in SHFs than in COOPs 
and NPOs, while the costs of ownership-practice are comparatively lower. The cost-variables 
analyzed are not all of similar importance, and local contexts will influence this. However, the 
proposed lower costs of ownership-practice in SHFs provide strong support for the continued 
promotion of this ownership type, as well as welcoming new investors into the industry. 
Nevertheless, such promotion should not be done at the expense of COOPs and NPOs who, 
according to the theory, can more effectively mitigate the costs of market contracts. Such 
mitigation is highly relevant since most MFOs operate in severely inefficient markets. It is 
probable that the development of markets with a mixture of ownership types would best serve 
the customers. 
 
Comparing this theory with current policies indicates that policy makers consider the costs of 
ownership-practice to be more important than costs related to market contracts. Whether this 
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is based on a comprehensive analysis or ideological preferences remains unanswered. We 
propose that the costs of market contracts have not been sufficiently included when 
advocating ownership policies in the microfinance industry. Certainly the problems related to 
asymmetric information between depositors and MFOs are being debated. However, the 
response to these problems, through prudent regulations, supervision, and deposit insurance 
schemes, seems to be inadequate. In developing economies suffering from very weak 
institutional frameworks as well as imperfect markets and incomplete information (Todaro 
and Smith, 2006), installing prudent regulations seems far-fetched.   
 
Several policy papers seem to be guided by agency theory applied to the relationship between 
owners and management. In addition to this, we recommend future policy papers and 
academic research to broaden their theoretical perspectives. A better understanding of NPOs 
and COOPs and their possible role in market economies is needed. Adequate use of 
stakeholder theory to help identify ‘Who’ and ‘What’ really counts in MFOs can help 
(Mitchell et al., 1997, Freeman, 1984, Freeman, 1994). 
 
We argue that ownership costs are intrinsic and thus cannot be completely neutralized. 
However, they can partly be balanced. Particularly in the microfinance industry, the use of 
hybrid ownership forms where NPOs are major owners in SHFs is common. Also common 
are NPOs being fully governed by international donors similar to the owners of SHFs. 
Besides, some international lenders to NPOs may provide long-term uncollateralized loans, 
where the rate of interest depends on the profits and the lender can be given a position on the 
board.  These examples illustrate that practitioners are aware of the costs related to ownership. 
Such balancing measurements may offer particular promise in meeting the multiple needs of 
MFOs. Thus, researchers should study the impact and side effects of such measurements.  
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 The history of savings banks can provide important insight to understand the existence of 
NPOs in the microfinance industry better. As NPOs today, the first savings banks were also in 
need of equity capital from donors, either wealthy philanthropists, local authorities, or 
community funds like corn chambers meant for lean years. The NPO ownership type, still 
present in most savings banks, gave the donors the assurance they needed to support the new 
initiatives. However, as the banks grew and started to depend more on commercial funding 
and deposits, the nonprofit form was kept, but now as a response to asymmetric information 
between depositors and the banks (Hansmann, 1996, Hansmann, 1989, Pampillon, 2003, 
Ograda, 2003, Pohl, 2003, Rønning, 1972). One question which remains unanswered is why 
transformation of NPOs into SHFs is needed today when it wasn’t needed before. Legal 
frameworks provide part of the answer. Thus, a revision to adapt the legal frameworks to 
NPOs’ and COOPs’ needs seems appropriate. The history of savings banks and their 
continued success in several markets should demonstrate that being commercially oriented 
and mobilizing savings is not necessarily incompatible with being an NPO. 
 
Imperfect markets and exploitation of customers are likely to continue in most developing 
countries for several decades. At the same time, some donors will continue to search for 
partners with less intrinsic motivation to exploit them. Hence, we expect COOPs and well-
performing NPOs to continue to play an important role in the microfinance industry. 
However, this is only possible if adequate legal and policy support is given. Historically, 
support of novel ownership forms has been important to underpin the growth of pro-poor 
banking systems like the savings banks in England and Norway, and the cooperative and 
mutual banks in Germany and the USA (Teck, 1968, Hollis and Sweetman, 1998, Rønning, 
1972). Therefore, if COOPs and NPOs are to continue playing a dominant role in the industry, 
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alongside the needed SHFs, they will need better policy and legal support. Further research on 
how to understand and support NPOs and COOPs better is needed. 
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